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The idea of the fetish has a particular presence in the writings of both Marx and Freud. It 
implies for these two theorists of the social, a particular form of relation between human 
beings and objects. In the work of both the idea of the fetish involves attributing properties to 
objects that they do not 'really' have and that should correctly be recognised as human. While 
Marx's account of fetishism addresses the exchange-value of commodities at the level of the 
economic relations of production, it fails to deal in any detail with the use-value or 
consumption of commodities. In contrast Freud's concept of the fetish as a desired substitute 
for a suitable sex object explores how objects are desired and consumed. Drawing on both 
Marx and Freud, Baudrillard breaks with their analyses of fetishism as demonstrating a 
human relation with unreal objects. He  explores the creation of value in objects through the 
social exchange of sign values, showing how objects are fetishised in ostentation. This paper 
argues that while Baudrillard breaks with the realism characteristic of Marx's and Freud's 
analyses of fetishism, he does not go far enough in describing the social and discursive 
practices in which objects are used and sometimes transformed into fetishes. It is proposed 
that the fetishisation of objects involves an overdetermination of their social value through a 




The social sciences have, in general, shown a lack of interest in relations 
between human beings and the material objects in their environment. What 
has taken centre stage is either the human individual or the relations between 
humans that constitute both social interaction and social structure. Marx and 
Freud were both key contributors to the emerging human sciences who have 
exerted enormous influence. The major focus of both is on the form and 
antecedence of human identity and relations between humans but both have 
used the term 'fetishism' to begin to describe human relations with material 
objects; non-human things in the world with which pseudo-human relations 
are established.  
For Marx the reality of the commodity is its representation of congealed labour 
through which it derives its value. In its unreal or fetishised form the 
commodity appears to have intrinsic value derived from its material character. 
The fetishised commodity represents a misconception of the origins of value - 
the system of ideas supporting capitalist production that Marx calls 
'commodity fetishism'. For Freud the reality of shoes or undergarments is as 
clothes, as items worn as part of normal apparel. But the unreal or fetish form 
of the shoe or undergarment is, for the fetishist, an agent of sexual arousal.  
In Freud's work the unreal object that arouses the fetishist indicates a 
perversion. Its origins lie in a misconception of the lack in the female genitalia 
that leads to a substitute for the proper sexual object. 
In the work of Marx and Freud the term 'fetishism' is used to identify a 
misunderstanding of the world in which properties are attributed to objects 
that can only correctly be attributed to human beings. The use of the term 
allows them to connect these misunderstandings to a pre-humanistic scheme 
in which spirits, sometimes residing within material objects, were treated as a 
significant part of the ontological order of the world. Their use of the terms 
'fetish' and 'fetishism' continue a tradition of cultural critique with its origins in 
commentary on religious practices surrounding objects. To identify a fetish is 
to expose the inadequate beliefs of those who revere it for what they believe it 
is capable of, by pointing to the real, material, qualities of the object and 
identifying its presumed capacities as really residing elsewhere - in the 'true' 
god; in human labour; in arousal by a person of the opposite sex. 
Treating fetishes as 'unreal' overlooks the importance of the object as a 
mediator of social value. Marx did not explore why some commodities might 
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be more fetishised than others. Freud conjectured on the symbolic origins of 
sexual fetishes but did not explore the meaning of fetishes systematically as 
he did dream contents. What I want to explore in this paper is how the term 
fetish might be used analytically, not to critique or debunk a set of ignorant 
beliefs or deviant perceptions, but to explore how material objects are valued 
in cultural contexts. 
After mentioning the origins of the term 'fetishism' and how it might be defined, 
I shall look at how Marx and the psychoanalytic tradition have used the term 
critically to undermine a perspective or mode of life. Despite treating material 
objects as no more than they 'really' are (their concrete and material function) 
Marx recognised that the need for objects is in part determined culturally and 
Freud noted that fetishism is not always deviant but may express a 'normal' 
sexual interest in objects. 
It is Baudrillard who begins to treat fetishism as a sign of social value; the 
fetish object is taken to stand for the owner's social status. Here the fetish is 
no longer an unreal object, believed to have properties it does not really have, 
but is a means of mediating social value through material culture. I will 
suggest that Baudrillard's use of the term fetishism can be extended to look at 
the way some objects are overdetermined at the level of social value. 
Making the fetish 
Although related to the Latin word factitius (= made by art), the contemporary 
English word fetish seems to derive from the Portuguese word feitiço (= a 
charm, sorcery) a name for talismans in the middle ages that were often 
illegal or heretical (Pietz 1985: 6). The Portuguese word was used to refer to 
witchcraft and was part of the language of sailors in the 15th Century 
travelling from Portugal to the Guinea coast of West Africa (Pietz 1987: 24). 
The modern meaning of fetish and fetishism is generally agreed to have 
originated in the work of Charles de Brosses writing in 1760 who used the 
term to describe the religious practices of worshipping objects (Pietz 1993: 
134; Simpson 1982: 127). De Brosses coined the term to refer to the worship 
of inanimate objects as gods, a practice that had been recorded by travellers 
to West Africa. It is clear that Marx read de Brosses and it is from his proto-
anthropological analysis that Marx derives his 1842 definition of the term as 
the 'religion of the senses': 
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This notion of the fetish worshipper's desire-driven 
delusion regarding natural objects, his blindness to the 
unprovidential randomness of physical events was an 
element in de Brosses's original theorisation of 
fétichisme as the pure condition of un-enlightenment. 
(Pietz 1993: 136) 
The connections between the origins of the word 'fetishism', its 
'anthropological' meaning and Marx's usage are clear and documented. The 
connection with its use in psychoanalysis to refer to sexual fixation on an 
object is not so clear. According to Robert Nye, in a paper of 1882 Charcot 
and Magnan referred to what we have come to know as classical sexual 
fetishism (erotic obsessions for aprons, shoes, shoe nails) but did not use this 
term. In 1887 Alfred Binet, Charcot's student, used the term in a paper 
discussing these perversions in the context of religious fetishism (Nye 1993: 
21; Gamman and Makinen 1994: 17). In 1886 Krafft Ebing had treated 
'fetichism' as a pathological tendency, connected to stealing female linen, 
handkerchiefs and shoes. While he emphasised the criminological aspect he 
also connected it to sexuality (Gamman and Makinen 1994: 39). Quite how 
sexual fetishism is linked with the religious fetishism described by de Brosses 
remains unclear. However, the term fetishism seems to have taken on its 
broad cultural meanings by the middle of the nineteenth century so that the 
Shorter OED can offer as a figurative definition dating from 1837 "something 
irrationally reverenced".  
There are then three fields in which the term fetishism is used that we may 
treat as; proto-anthropology, the analysis of the commodity form and the 
analysis of sexual perversion. The term seems to originate in the first of these 
fields and is then employed analogously in the latter two. Gamman and 
Makinen sum up its use in all three fields: 
Fetishism, we would argue, is by definition a 
displacement of meaning through synecdoche, the 
displacement of the object of the desire onto something 
else through processes of disavowal. (Gamman and 
Makinen 1994: 45) 
It is through the displacement of desire that an object acquires special social 
value, indicated by the reverence, worship or fascination with which it is 
treated. That desire may be for religious, economic or erotic value (the three 
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fields in which fetishism has been described) which then accrues in the object. 
What the Gamman and Makinen definition does is to suspend the realist 
account of fetishism by treating it as a displacement of meaning rather than a 
mistake or misunderstanding about the real nature of objects. 
A fetish is created through the veneration or worship of an object that is 
attributed some power or capacity, independently of its manifestation of that 
capacity. However, through the very process of attribution the object may 
indeed manifest those powers; the specialness with which the object is 
treated makes it special. The fetish object will, for example, influence the lives 
of its human worshippers, determining some of their actions and modifying 
their beliefs. In this process the object is mediating the powers delegated to it 
by worshippers. As with all mediation, the fetish is not merely reflecting back 
the ideas and beliefs of its worshippers, it is transforming them or, in the 
language of actor-network theory, 'translating' them (Callon 1991). The power 
of the fetish is not reducible to its material form any more than the meaning of 
a word can be reduced to its material representation (its sound or graphic 
shape). The symbolic power of the fetish can be repeated or replicated 
provided that there is some basis for continuity that is recognisable to the 
worshipper. The graven image can be copied, the form of the animal is 
repeated in each example of the species, shoes can be endlessly exchanged 
as commodities and join countless others in a collection.  
The meaning of the specific object is apparent only in a series of objects. The 
thing to be venerated is distinguished from those to be treated as rubbish or 
as mere utensils. Such distinctions are embedded within cultural codes that 
are emergent in sets of practices within the culture. This is precisely why the 
fetish object cannot be decoded by a realist perspective in any transcultural 
way; what is 'real' in one cultural code is 'unreal' in another. To use the term 
'fetish' in a realist mode is to engage in cultural critique; it is to identify 
someone else's reality as an illusion, an unreality. I wish to argue that both 
Marx and Freud use the term fetishism in this realist mode to engage in forms 
of cultural critique. But there are chinks in the theoretical positions of both 
which permit a more reflexive position on fetishism to be drawn out. 
Commodity fetishism  
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts Marx uses the term 'fetish-
worshippers' to describe the supporters of the monetary and mercantile 
system and how they looked upon private property. Following Engels, he 
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compares the fetishism of the mercantilists to that revealed by Luther's 
critique of the paganism and external religiosity of Catholicism. The objects of 
private property stand in for real human relations and so appear to have a 
power that is their own whereas the political economists' critique shows that 
human labour is the essence of private property. Of course Marx goes on to 
criticise the political economists for not identifying the contradictory essence 
of private property as the product of alienated labour.   
Whereas in proto-anthropology the term 'fetish' referred to the cultural 
meanings and uses of certain objects, in Marx's account the term is used to 
criticise more general beliefs about capitalist culture. Nothing more specific 
than 'private property' in general is identified as the fetish object (although 
later in the Manuscripts Marx does specify metal money as a fetish, referring 
to the dazzle of its "sensuous glitter" (Marx 1975: 364)).  
In the later, more famous, account of fetishism in Capital, Marx follows a very 
similar line but here the analysis is of the commodity form rather than private 
property. The 'real' value of a commodity is analysed as a social relation 
determined by the amount of labour that has gone into its production - it is 
nothing to do with the material form of the commodity (Marx 1976: 165). The 
exchange value of commodities appears to be something intrinsic to them as 
objects and their relationship as things. But this form of their value is illusory 
since the fetishised exchange establishes a fantastic relationship between 
things that obscures the real relationship between people - workers whose 
labour produces things of value to others2. The cultural forms which 
incorporate such 'fantasies', mistaking them for reality, are critiqued by Marx 
in his analysis of commodity fetishism in Capital.  
Marx distinguishes the use-value of objects (the use they have to the human 
labourer) from their exchange-value (the fetishised, fantastic form of value 
they have as commodities). Use-values are to do with the quality of objects 
and are only realised in use or consumption whereas exchange values are 
quantifiable in terms of other commodities (Marx 1976: 126-128). As 
Baudrillard points out (1981: 130-4), Marx restricts his analysis of commodity 
fetishism to exchange-value whilst use-value remains "an abstraction" a 
residual category, prior to and outside the economic relations of socially 
assigned value, of equivalence and of quantity.   
The difficulty with Marx's analysis is that it obscures the processes of 
consumption and the links between use-value and exchange-value. Exchange 
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involves consumption and judgements about the relative quality of similar 
goods (e.g. their fitness for purpose, their substitutability) which in turn lead to 
conferring social value on goods which affects the determination of economic 
value. These judgements are derived from the exchange of signs concerning 
the relative merits and capacities of goods to meet needs. They are realised 
as the desire for a particular object which is then expressed in the willingness, 
given sufficient capacity, to exchange for it. That objects might have some 
complex form of social value (beauty, functionality, longevity) is overlooked by 
Marx in order to emphasise the basis of economic value in human labour.  
It seems as if Marx, especially in the first chapters of Capital, takes needs as 
biologically given and the natural, qualitative use-value of goods as the same 
in all societies (Sahlins 1976: 148-161)3. But Sahlins points out that in the 
Grundrisse Marx showed how consumption was part of the process by which 
the use-value of objects emerges: 
... the object is not an object in general, but a specific 
object which must be consumed in a specific manner, to 
be mediated in its turn by production itself. Hunger is 
hunger, but the hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten 
with a knife and fork is a different hunger from that 
which bolts down raw meat with the aid of hand, nail and 
tooth. Production thus produces not only the object but 
also the manner of consumption, not only objectively 
but also subjectively. (Marx 1973: 92) 
Marx is still describing a real basis for the use-value of objects that is a natural 
given - here the biological need of 'hunger'. But reality is not presented as a 
fixed, stable state against which fetishised forms can be distinguished. The 
nature of the object changes and so must its use-value in a dialectical process 
of production and consumption. Sahlins suggests that the absence of a theory 
of meaning is the reason for Marx's failure to deal adequately with the social 
relations of material objects; it is through their socially construed meaning that 
they come to have specific use-values that vary with different modes of 
consumption (1976: 151). 
Sexual fetishism 
Freud follows previous usage by Binet (in a paper from 1888) of the term 
fetishism in discussions of sexual perversion. Fetishistic perversions were 
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regarded as "the degrading consequences of a weakening of morals in a 
profoundly vitiated society" (Charcot and Magnan quoted in Nye 1993: 21) but 
it was Binet who identified the 'psychic impotence' characteristic of the sexual 
obsession with a part of the body or inanimate objects that went with a 
decadent and enfeebled culture. The critique of sexual deviations and 
perversions by the French writers on deviation (who Matlock says called 
themselves aliénistes, 1993: 32) was, Robert Nye suggests, tied to a 
particularly French anxiety about the health and size of the population at the 
end of the nineteenth century.  
Freud treats fetishism as a deviation from the 'normal' sexual aim of 
copulation leading to the release of sexual tension "...a satisfaction analogous 
to the sating of hunger (Freud 1977a : 61). It involves a sexual overvaluation4 
of a substitute object, that while related to the sex object is nonetheless 
unsuited to the normal sexual aim. Fetish objects include parts of the body 
(the foot, hair) and objects which are connected to the person for whom they 
substitute (clothing or underclothes). Freud is quite clear that fetishism, along 
with other deviations in sexual aim, is not in itself indicative of neuroses or 
mental illness. It is only when it goes to extremes in overcoming the 
resistance of shame, disgust, horror or pain (he gives the examples of licking 
excrement or of intercourse with dead bodies) that these sorts of deviations 
become pathological. What he suggests is that it is normal to make additions 
or extensions to the normal sexual aim, substituting objects for the 'real' thing 
(the union of genitals): 
A certain degree of fetishism is thus habitually present 
in normal love, especially in those stages of it in which 
the normal sexual aim seems unattainable or its 
fulfilment prevented. (Freud 1977a: 66) 
There is only a problem with fetishism when the object substitutes completely 
for the real thing and when the diversity of sexual objects channelling the sex 
drive towards the real thing is replaced by a single sex object which is 
'overvalued'.  
The sexual fetish is then a symbolic substitute that has an analogous or 
metonymical association with the normal sex object (e.g. fur as a fetish is a 
symbolic substitute for a woman's pubic hair - Freud 1977a: 68). In his paper 
of 1927 on Fetishism Freud suggests that the fetish is a substitute for the 
lack of a penis in the little boy's mother. The boy child who is later to be a 
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fetishist disavows the discovery fearing that if she has been castrated then he 
might be too. However, the disavowal is not an effective denial; the boy child 
has retained his belief that women have a penis but he has also given it up 
(Freud 1977b: 353). The contradiction is resolved by the belief that the 
woman does have a penis but it is no longer the same; something has been 
appointed as its substitute - the fetish. Freud says that it is not possible to 
unravel the associative origins of a particular fetish with any certainty though 
they are likely to lie in the frozen memory of the moment of discovering the 
lack. The last thing seen before the realisation that the mother is not phallic 
becomes a symbolic substitute for the phallus that is not there (shoes, fur, 
velvet, underclothing)  (Freud 1977b: 354-355). 
It seems as if the fetish is only available as a sex object for men but Jann 
Matlock points to the connection between cross dressing by women and 
clothing fetishes (1993). Elizabeth Grosz follows the line, suggested by Freud, 
that in pampering herself, what the narcissistic woman does is to treat her 
whole body it as if it were a phallus thereby fetishising it (Grosz 1993 - a 
similar point is made by Baudrillard 1993: 107-110). However, the lesbian 
lover, suggests Grosz, like the fetishist disavows women's castration, but this 
is her own castration not that of her mother. And also like the fetishist, the 
lesbian takes as a substitute for the phallus, an object outside her own body; 
the body of her lover. Gamman and Makinen (1994) argue that the traditional 
psychoanalytic account of fetishism androcentrically focuses the articulation of 
desire on the penis and its lack. Using an account of sexual fetishism modified 
through Kleinian theory, they propose a less gendered and genitaled account 
of fetishism that incorporates oral and other gratifications whilst retaining the 
disavowal of the fetishist. This enables them to extend the use of the term 
fetishism to include pathological and non-pathological relations with clothes 
and food that express an ambivalence about identity but provide a source of 
real gratification (1994: 111). Their gendered but balanced account of different 
mechanisms of adult perversity explains how sexual fetishism occurs 
predominantly - but not exclusively - in men, eating obsessions and the 
obsessive consumption of style are predominantly but not exclusively female 
fetishes.   
Deprived of its phallocentrism the psychoanalytic account of fetishism focuses 
on the dynamics of human desire for objects substitute or 'stand in' for 
something human. Freud, and Binet before him, both recognised that desire 
for objects is a normal part of human existence. Fetishism might be born of a 
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frustration or confusion of normal desire, a sublimation or redirection of sexual 
needs, but this is almost characteristic of the human condition. It is neither 
pathological nor in itself destructive of human social being5. 
Semiotic fetishism 
A recurrent theme in Jean Baudrillard's work is the relationship between the 
social subject and the object. To begin with the object is material and distinct 
from the subject but as his theory develops, the object becomes progressively 
more enravelled with the subject, as inscription on the body and later as a 
social object that incorporates subject positions, ideas as well as material 
form. This theoretical development goes against Marx's clear distinction 
between subject and object that asserts the primacy of the human subject. 
For Baudrillard the fetish is the site of a merging or confusion of subject and 
object and, especially in the later work, the object seems to be primary. 
In his early work Baudrillard criticises Marx's analysis of commodity fetishism, 
arguing that use-value is a fetishised social relation just as much as 
exchange-value (1981: 131). The object that is to become a commodity, 
available for exchange, must be valued according to a code of functionality 
which orders both human subjects and material objects (1981: 130-4). Use-
value is not an inherent property of the object nor functionality reflective of 
innate human needs or desires. For Baudrillard the 'object', the thing that has 
a use is "nothing but the different types of relations and significations that 
converge, contradict themselves and twist around it" (1981: 63). The object of 
consumption does not exist in relation to pure, natural, asocial, human needs 
but is produced as a sign in a system of relations of difference with other 
objects. The process of consumption Baudrillard understands not as the 
realisation of objective needs or of economic exchange but as the social 
exchange of signs and values (1981: 75). 
Baudrillard describes objects as signs in a code of significatory value can be 
manipulated between the two registers of functionality and ostentation 
(Veblen's conspicuous consumption). Both registers can be part of the same 
object so the useless gadget combines "pure gratuitousness under a cover of 
functionality, pure waste under a cover of practicality" (Baudrillard 1981: 32). 
Now, it is the extent to which an object demonstrates ostentation, a sign of 
value that accrues to the possessor of the object that turns the object into a 
fetish.  
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The television set that is broken but retains its prestige value in a culture in 
which hardly anybody can afford a television is an example of the "pure fetish" 
(1981: 55). But in western culture it is in the ritual that surrounds the object, 
the routines and practices of watching the television that give it its fetish 
character (1981: 56). The television functions as a machine that mediates 
communications but it is also an object that is consumed in itself, signifying 
membership of the community as a "token of recognition, of integration, of 
social legitimacy" (1981: 54). The 'worship' of the television set is through 
"systematic, non-selective viewing" and the "apparent passivity of long hours 
of viewing" that actually hides a "laborious patience" (1981: 55). The television 
takes up a place in our homes, requires a reorganisation of other objects that 
inhabit them and demands a certain level of commitment in return for the 
minimal level of social status it confers. Objects like the television have a sign 
value that is in excess of their functional capacities. Each object "... finds 
meaning with other objects, in difference, according to a hierarchical code of 
significations" (Baudrillard 1981: 64). 
It is the system of objects as sign values and their exchange that Baudrillard 
terms "consummativity" (1981: 83), a dynamic of capitalist society that he 
juxtaposes to productivity. Consummativity is the system of needs for objects 
imposed on individual consumers - it includes their need for choice. Needs 
cannot be derived from a humanistic notion of the free, unalienated, asocial 
individual driven by craving or pleasure or even by some essential needs. 
Consumer needs are mobilised within individuals by the "strategy of desire" 
(1981: 85), an ideological effect of the social system achieved through the 
generalised exchange of signs. It is through the circulation of objects as signs 
that the quality or use-value of objects is distinguished. 
Baudrillard takes Marx to task for using the metaphor of fetishism to avoid an 
analysis of the ideological labour involved in consumption6. Taking up the 
psychoanalytic use of fetishism as a refusal of sex differences "a perverse 
structure that perhaps underlies all desire" (1981: 90), Baudrillard points out 
that the fetish object involves a fetishism of the signifier, a passion for the 
code. The fetishism of commodities as objects is the fascination and worship 
of the system of differences, the code of signs that the object or good 
represents. The system of objects as signs is continually shifting emphasis 
from one term to another so that, unlike the perverse desire of the sexual 
fetishist, the perverse desire of the commodity fetishist is constantly being 
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redirected. In describing how the beauty of the body is fetishised, Baudrillard 
points out that a model of beauty is constructed so that... 
It is the sign in this beauty, the mark (makeup, 
symmetry, or calculated asymmetry, etc.) which 
fascinates; it is the artifact that is the object of desire. 
(Baudrillard 1981: 94) 
The make-up of 'beauty', of the erotic body, is a process of 'marking it'  though 
ornamentation, jewellery, perfume or through 'cutting it up' into partial objects 
(feet, hair, breasts, buttocks etc.). This work produces the body as a series of 
signs, creates it as an object with a significatory value. 
For Baudrillard the shift from the exchange of symbolic value to the exchange 
of sign value is characteristic of modernity and "properly constitutes the 
ideological process" (1981: 98). The symbolic object had a direct if ambivalent 
relationship with the person; in the Aztec and Egyptian cultures the sun 
provided life-giving heat and light but was worshipped because it could also 
take life away. In modern cultures the object as a sign is exchangeable in a 
series with other signs (the vacation sun, the sun-lamp, the gym) in an 
ideological system (the healthy body) through which they can be fetishised. 
Within this exchange of sign values, fetishism is the "fascination" felt both by 
individuals and by the culture as a whole with those signs that have been 
positively valorised.  
In modern culture fetishism articulates the subject in and through the object 
world as signs are read and exchanged. This is not a fetishism of  symbolic 
exchange, of lived and felt relationships with objects, based on ritual, worship 
and subjugation to the power of objects. In modern cultures the merging of 
subject and object happens on the surface of the body as it is inscribed with 
visible marks that transform its meaning, inserting the consequent 
subject/object into the circulation of signs.  
Many of the issues raised in the essay "Fetishism and Ideology: The 
Semiological Reduction" ([1972]1981) are reprised in "The Body: The Mass 
Grave of Signs" ([1976] 1993). Baudrillard looks again at how the marking of 
the body achieves a merging of subject and object but via fetishism because 
there is a "symbolic articulation of lack" (1993: 101). He lists a series of 
objects that inscribe the surface form of the body including: "the stripper's G-
string, bracelets, necklaces, rings, belts, jewels and chains" (1993: 101). 
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While overlapping the list of fetishising devices in the earlier essay (1981: 94) 
the objects here are theorised, following Lacan, as 'bars' that both divide up 
the surface of the body and semiologically separate the signifier from the 
signified. The bar "erects" the body or body part into a sign of that which is 
lacking - the phallus. Even material that overlays the surface of the body, 
lipstick for example7, has the effect of inserting the body into the exchange of 
signs of a phallic (sexual) order. In modern society the signs are read in 
relation to the subject identity that they overlay so that: 
[t]he subject is no longer eliminated in the exchange, it 
speculates. The subject, not the savage, is enmeshed in 
fetishism; through the investment [faire-valoir] of its 
body, it is the subject that is fetishised by the law of 
value.  (Baudrillard 1993: 107) 
The fetishisation of the body through makeup and adornment creates a 
seductive sexuality that is not grounded in real sexuality. It is no more than a 
sign or simulacra, a circulation of meaning through which the subject is 
transformed by sign objects into a fetishised object. It is this obsession with 
signs and "the reduction of political economy, sexuality and eventually all 
material and social reality to sign play" that leads Kellner to brand Baudrillard 
himself a "sign fetishist" (Kellner 1989: 100; 199). 
The account of the body as a fetishised commodity, shows how monopoly 
capitalism not only exploits the productivity of the body as labour power, 
alienating it through the commodification of labour, but also exploits the 
'consummativity' of the body, reifying it through marking its sexuality. 
However, Baudrillard does not comment on the (at least partially) gendered 
distinction between the fetishised body as labour power and the fetishised 
body of made-up beauty. As he turns away from Marx's political economic 
analysis, Baudrillard responds to the anthropological writings of Mauss and 
Bataille where in the pre-modern symbolic form of exchange between subject 
and object, devices such as tattooing insert the whole body into a symbolic 
exchange in which it can be possessed or dispossessed. What he seems to 
disapprove of is the overwriting of the real body and its sexuality by material 
signs in modernity and his critique harks back to the irreversibility of a material 
culture based on symbolic exchange. 
But Baudrillard shifts ground again in later work investing the object itself with 
the capacity to reverse the determinacy between subject and object. In 
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Seduction (1990a) and Fatal Strategies (1990b), now more under the 
influence of Caillois and Canetti, he explores capacity of the object to 
"seduce" the subject, to reduce the determinative effect of the social and to 
lead the subject into the indeterminate realm of chance and the vertiginous, 
spinning body. Determination, the process of causality, even in the material 
world, is called into question: 
The reaction to this new state of things has not been a 
resigned abandonment of old values but rather a mad 
overdetermination, an exacerbation of these values of 
reference, function, finality and causality. (Baudrillard 
1990b: 11)  
Whereas production was the irreversible, modern process of dominance of 
subject over object relations, seduction emerges as the reversible, 
postmodern mode of relationship between subject and object. The result is 
not the emergence of something new but an excess of the old values; in the 
face of indeterminacy, overdetermination becomes "hyperdetermination" 
(Baudrillard 1990b: 12). The fetish becomes for Baudrillard a representative of 
the power of the object to determine the subject, to reverse causality 
(Baudrillard 1990b: 114).  
The prime case of the fetish is the work of art - an object which has 
consciously and intentionally been made by a subject investing subjective 
capacity in the object. This is the 'absolute commodity', that for Baudrillard 
following Baudelaire, is beyond function and cannot be reduced to exchange 
or use-value. It becomes detached from its production to become foreign, 
itself beyond determination but nonetheless still determining human subjects 
"it glows with a veritable seduction that comes from elsewhere" (1990b: 118). 
There are four problems with Baudrillard's analysis of social relations with 
objects and with fetishes in particular. Firstly, objects seem to have only two 
social dimensions; function and ostentation. As I shall suggest below there 
are a number of forms of social relations with objects that could lead to 
fetishisation. Secondly, Baudrillard treats the consumption of objects simply in 
terms of the exchange of signs without exploring the relation between sign 
value and practical use value. Thirdly, it is not clear in his analysis to what 
extent all commodities are fetishes and, if they are, whether they have the 
same fetish quality. After 1972 the only fetish he discusses in any detail is the 
fetishised female body. Fourthly, and this is also characteristic of his work 
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after 1972, the source of sign value is progressively disconnected from social 
practices until it becomes 'hyperdetermined'. At this point he is no longer 
interested in the fetishisation of material objects in the mundane practices of 
everyday life. 
Fetishism and the consumption of objects 
As they identify fetish objects, Marx and Freud engage in a modernist form of 
auto-cultural critique that supersedes the critique of alien cultures and 
religions. They discover the displacement of real human relations by unreal 
objects in the secular culture of the nineteenth century by alienation and 
fetishism. Their critique aims for the liberation of human nature from the 
bonds of a culture in which some are free but others are either oppressed or 
repressed, by showing what human life would be like without the inversions of 
fetishism. For Marx there is a biological 'need' for material objects that 
underlies the processes of production, consumption and exchange. For Freud 
the underlying normal sexual aim is a different form of hunger, the biological, 
sexual 'need' that is manifest as desire which may be redirected towards 
objects in sexual fetishism. A sublimated erotic desire for objects is then a 
means by which they attain special social value. 
Everyday life in capitalism involves a set of relationships with objects that 
enable us to do what we do. This is the largely unexplicated use-value of 
objects, their capacity to fulfil our needs. Contemporary commentators on 
commodity fetishism (Geras 1976; Godelier 1977; Wells 1981: Jhally 1987) 
recognise that the objects of commodity fetishism have relations with human 
beings but they do not analyse what they are. In the Grundrisse Marx 
recognised that need and consumption were produced and this is developed 
by Baudrillard who incorporates Freud's notion of desire into the relations 
between individuals and objects8. 'Need' is a product of the circulation of signs 
and objects at the ideological rather than the economic level. This provides a 
way of understanding how the fetish works as an object in everyday life 
without leading to neuroses9 but it does not explore the social practices in 
which objects are consumed and fetishised.  
It is somewhere between the subject and object that the fetish emerges; 
... the interesting thing about a fetish ... is that it is never 
clear ... whether it is really an object or whether it is part 
of the self. A fetish ... can be thought of as existing in a 
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free space between the subject and the object. (Levin 
1984: 42) 
Before exploring the fetish quality of objects it is useful to sketch the more 
mundane features of consumption, the sociological form of human 
relationships with material objects. Consumption involves four modes of 
human relations with material objects. Firstly a physical relation that is to do 
with shape, colour, texture, strength, flexibility and possible movements (think 
of getting on a bus). It is this that distinguishes material objects from other 
cultural objects (such as kinship systems, myths). The physical properties of 
material objects lead to a set of limitations on their capacities (the top speed 
of the bus, the number of people who can get on) thereby articulating the uses 
by subjects. But, secondly, objects are used within cultural practices that also 
specify and constrain their use (bus time tables, regulations on numbers of 
passengers). Thirdly, objects are signs in themselves that locate the object 
within cultural parameters including time and space (as a London bus from 
the 1960-70s). Fourthly, the object may provide a surface for linguistic or 
quasi-linguistic texts to play across (the advertisement on the side of the bus). 
It is through these different modes of interaction that subjects realise the 
capacities of material objects. Obviously some objects are experienced more 
through one mode than another and the orientation of the subject will affect 
the mode (buses are largely experienced by passengers in a physical mode; 
car drivers experience them more as signs or surfaces for messages). 
It is in the process of consumption, which refers not merely to the purchase of 
objects but to the use, enjoyment and disposal of the capacities of those 
objects (Miller 1987: 190-191), that a relationship between human subjects 
and material objects is established. The human subject derives the benefit of 
various 'capacities' when s/he interacts with material objects that enhance 
her/his capacity in a number of ways:10.  
1. Function The object extends or enhances the human physical 
action of its user11; e.g. as a tool the car actually transports its user.  
2. Ostension The object signifies the social group membership of its 
user: e.g. the distinction of a tiara, the clan identification of a football 
scarf.  
3. Sexuality The object arouses its user or others or both, as a sign 
from a code indicating sexual action, identity and interest, through 
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bodily display, sensuality or substitution; e.g. the wearing of tights or 
tight-fitting jeans.  
4. Knowledge The object delivers knowledge to its user by storing 
simple information or a synthetic understanding of some aspect of 
the world; e.g. book or any other complex textual object. 
5. Aesthetics The beauty or form of the object directly moves the 
emotions of users by representing pure values; e.g. the 'object 
d'art'.  
6. Mediation The object enables or enhances communications 
between humans; e.g. a telephone; the decorative item that is a 
talking point; the heirloom that links generations. 
Many objects will deliver more than one of these six capacities in different 
degrees. The capacities of objects are not a consequence of the object's 
material form but emerge in the social and material milieu in which it is 
consumed - no doubt the list would be refined and extended through empirical 
study.  
Now, the fetish quality of an object is the reverence or the fascination for it 
that arises out of its capacities but is expressed over and beyond its simple 
consumption. This fetish quality is attested through ritualistic practices that 
celebrate or revere the object, a class of objects, items from a 'known' 
producer or even the brand name of a range of products. These ritualistic 
practices will involve expressing desire for the object and fantasising about its 
capacities prior to its consumption. The object itself becomes a sign for these 
fantasised and desired capacities so that its use or enjoyment can re-
stimulate the play of fantasy and desire. Unlike sexual fetishism where the 
fantasy is usually personal, the fetishism of consumption involves the social 
negotiation and sharing of the value of the object so the ritualistic practices 
that fetishise objects will involve discursive action related to the object and its 
capacities. Expressing desire for and approval of the object and its capacities, 
celebrating the object, revering it, setting it apart, displaying it, extolling and 
exalting its capacities, eulogising it, enthusiastic use of it, are the sorts of 
practices that fetishise objects. The cumulative effect of these practices 
amount to an overdetermination12 of the social value of the object in that it is 
not merely consumed (exchanged and used) but in addition the object or 
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class of objects can be enjoyed at the level of imagination (fantasy and 
desire). 
One way that social value is overdetermined is through the demonstration of 
excess capacity in the object which cannot be used other than as a sign of 
value. An example would be the car that has an excess of power; the power 
cannot actually be used on the road but driving the car allows it to act as a 
sign of that power. The excess in capacity of the object is one way of marking 
the reverence with which it is treated; a photograph of a leader, whether 
massively blown up or merely given pride of place on the wall is made into a 
fetish by the reverence for its value that exceeds its mediative capacity. 
Excess of capacity suggests a latent capacity of the object to deliver human 
qualities (love, power, authority, sexuality, security, status, intellect, 
exoticism). The overdetermination of sign value focuses on these 'human' 
capacities so that the object can substitute for these qualities in human lives. 
Provided that others (a group large and coherent enough to secure the 
meaning of the object as a sign) recognise the extended capacities of the 
fetish object, they will also recognise the accrual of these capacities to those 
associated with it. So, the powerful car makes its driver powerful, the revered 
photograph confers authority on the national leader. It is not then the simple 
capacity of the object that indicates its fetish character but what it means as a 
sign of social value. Identifying the fetish is not a matter of judging true or real 
capacities in the object but recognising the multiple sources of positive 
valuation that overdetermine its value. It is the cumulative effect of these 
multiple sources that approve excess capacity and interpret its significance. 
Advertising, critical commentary, discussions of product development, reports 
of consumer testing, as well as evaluations of objects in interpersonal 
exchanges have not only created a market for commodities but have also 
defined modes of consumption. Public use of an object displays its capacities 
to others who might then desire to use the same or similar objects. It is 
through these practices that objects become fascinating, acquire a 'special 
status', and become revered or worshipped for how they might enhance 
human capacities. The process of fetishisation of consumption is much the 
same for a work of art as it is for a style of trainer or a motor car. In this largely 
discursive context objects are not merely sanctified by the claims of 
producers, commentators and critics, they are subject to a negotiation of their 
capacities, of their usefulness to users. It is from the discursive context that 
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desire for objects emerges; to know what one wants one first has to know 
what it is and what it might do. 
Conclusions 
Baudrillard supplements Marx's commodity fetishism by beginning to analyse 
the fetishism of use-value and the social impact of consumativity. He 
incorporates Freud's displacement of erotic value on to objects to understand 
the desire for objects, expressed in the circulation of signs that makes up the 
field of consummativity. But Baudrillard's later analysis becomes concerned 
with the indeterminate causality of the hyperreal. This analysis has the 
advantage of not reducing to a distinction between the 'real' object and the 
fetish but it leaves him unable to analyse the complexity of lived human 
relations with objects and to describe the source of their social value. In 
continuing Baudrillard's early move towards the social and away from the 
human, towards the semiotic and away from the real, I have begun to explore 
the way the use and capacities of material objects can lead to fascination and 
reverence. 
The term fetishism can refer to the relative quality of desire and fascination for 
an object that is not intrinsic but is nonetheless part of it. The reverence 
shown for its capacities supplements its material form, showing what it means 
how it is valued in its cultural context. A classic example is a perfume with 
very low production value but a high fetish value that is created by a series of 
signs attached to the object through advertising, packaging, personal approval 
and recommendation that are themselves human products that communicate 
value. The reverence for the object is founded in its capacities to change a 
person's smell (function), to declare their membership of a particular social 
group (ostension), to express their sexual identity and arouse others' sexual 
interest (sexuality), to demonstrate their understanding of what aromas are 
pleasing (knowledge) to explore the beauty of scent (aesthetics) and to 
communicate though this valuation of capacities with others (mediation). As 
these capacities are identified and extolled, many times over, the perfume 
becomes progressively fetishised. 
The fetish quality of cars, works of art, mobile 'phones, shirts and Italian food 
is not an intrinsic or stable quality of the object. It is assigned through cultural 
mediations, a circulation of signs, including the objects themselves. It is 
realised though a worshipful consumption of the objects in which reverence is 
displayed through desire for and an enthusiastic use of the object's capacities. 
21 
The fetishistic quality of objects varies over time and place and between 
different groups of people13. This is a fetishism of objects that does not 
distinguish their unreality from an essential material, natural or normal reality 
but recognises, at both the material and semiotic levels, the fetish as a 
cultural production, a work of humans that is as real as anything can be. 
 
                                            
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented to the BSA conference on 
Sexualities in Social Context, 28-31st March 1994. 
2 As Himmelweit and Mohun (1981) point out, the notion of value here is 
dependent on the process of exchange, rather than of production. Objects are 
associated with an exchange value only when they enter the market and are 
priced either in terms of quantities of other products or in terms of money. 
While concrete labour produces the object it is valued in the market place as 
socially necessary labour time (Himmelweit and Mohun 1981: 233). 
3 See for example, Marx's account of those things that have not been 
fetishised, things that have a use-value but no exchange-value (1976: 131). 
4 By 'overvaluation' Freud is referring to the tendency for the sexual aim to 
extend beyond the genitals to the whole body and indeed mind of the sex 
object - he suggests that it is rare for this deviation not to occur (Freud 1977a: 
62-63). 
5 Freud apparently said; "...half of humanity must be classed among the 
clothes fetishists. All women, that is, are clothes fetishists." See Rose 1988: 
156. 
6 Kellner takes Baudrillard to task for his limited reading of Marx (1989: 36-
39). He points out that in a number of places Marx does offer a more socio-
historical account of needs and their place in consumption. See above p. 9. 
7 It is clear that much of Baudrillard's interest in the fetishism of commodites 
and the fetishistic effect of makeup comes from Baudelaire whom he 
mentions (1981: 95), quotes a large section from "In Praise of Cosmetics" 
from The Painter of Modern Life (1990a: 93) and refers to again (1990b: 116 
fn). 
8 Even punning on the 'investissement' of the individual in an object - both an 
investment in the economic sense and a cathexis in the psychoanalytic sense. 
(Baudrillard 1981: 63 fn3). 
9 As Grosz remarks "the fetishist remains the most satisfied and contented of 
all perverts (the fetishist rarely if ever seeks analysis for fetishistic behaviour - 
the fetish never complains!)" (1993: 114). 
10 A similar account of the different levels on which an object can be 
apprehended is offered for different purposes by Eco (1977: 276). 
11 'Users' are are humans who have a career in which their experience of 
using objects in a variety of ways common to their culture moulds their identity 
as users. My thanks to Graeme Gilloch for a number of helpful comments, 
including pointing out that users cannot be taken as given. 
12 i.e. value is represented many times over - see Freud 1976: 389. 
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13 See Kellner's critical discussion of Baudrillard's early work - 1989: 27-32. 
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